



Challenges in Reliably Sanitizing Solid State Disks

Michael Wei, Steven Swanson Non-volatile Systems Laboratory UC San Diego





(THE POWER DE COMPANY

Overview

Past work in sanitizing disks

- US Coast Guard RMMs
 - Introduction
 - Sanitization & Evaluation
 - Report
- Scramble and Finally Erase (SAFE)

Previous Work: Reliably Sanitizing Solid-State Disks

Published in 2011:

4


Reliably Erasing Data from Flash-Based Solid State Drives Michael Wei, Laura M. Grupp, Frederick E. Spada, and Steven Swanson 9th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies (FAST' 11)

- Need to verify sanitization effectiveness
 - Built-in mechanisms are reliable when implemented correctly
 - Hard-drive techniques don't necessarily work
- Sanitizing single files (in place) is difficult
 - Software overwrite cannot reliably sanitize
 - Scrubbing allows us to sanitize files by modifying the FTL

Previous Work: Reliably Sanitizing Solid-State Disks

| SSD Name | Controller | SECURITY ERASE UNIT (ATA-3) | SECURITY ERASE UNIT ENHANCED (ATA-3) |
|----------|------------|--------------------------------|--|
| А | 1 | No | No |
| В | 2 | No (Reports yes) | No |
| С | 1 | Partial (Bugged) | No |
| D | 3 | Partial (Bugged) | No |
| E | 4 | Crypto Scrambles | Crypto Scrambles |
| F | 5 | Yes | Yes |
| G | 6 | Yes | No |
| н | 7 | Yes | Yes |
| I | 8 | Yes | Yes |

Previous Work: Reliably Sanitizing Solid-State Disks



Overview

7

- Past work in sanitizing disks
- US Coast Guard RMMs
 - Introduction
 - Sanitization & Evaluation
 - Report
- Scramble and Finally Erase (SAFE)

Coast Guard RMMs



- Part of the NATO ISR INTEROPERABILITY ARCHITECTURE (NIIA)
 - One storage interface and device for all NATO organizations
 - Can support SSDs or Hard Drive Arrays
- Need to be sanifized
 - At end of-life
 - If unit is in danger (i.e. plane crash, hostile takeover, etc.)
 - If security classification level changes
 - Want to use the same drive for both classified and unclassified missions

Sanitization and evaluation

- Wrote our fingerprint using the USB interface
- Returned drives to Coast Guard for sanitization
- Attempted to recover the fingerprint

Report

0123456789ABCDEF 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 8 8 9 95 BB CA A1 89 67 DY 85 6Y E1 CF 4C 19 •∞Ê;‰qB…oáÏL.|é~ ."¶«i..ā..~.10å. 04 84 B6 AB C5 16 D9 C3 57 17 78 ;.¢€já (ι.N″'í… 3B 9D A2 6A E1 5F 7B CE B9 03 lxeòzėóA.•læØËš. 31 78 55 FZ 7A 15 95 50 \ÚK, s20.å8..±fPò SC DA 4B 47 09 9A FO 01 . DHŇ'°Œ±ê...⊂V≫.-1B DD EA OO O7 43. 3.*jL·n..É.Lɰ,5 33 2E AA 6A 4C 95 F1 04 2E C9 90 4C CA 98 82 35 RÏ.¥⊣.qaïeŏ£.;Ö∎ 5Z CF ZE 12 67 **F**8 CY 65 F5 -ŸoÎv~%dĂ/p÷£°y~ I!≻Or,™¥à.A|.zýÎ £14¤»Ö4..X"****.{== ⁻*föe7ö[~¥*7—"eá Ó«äl!°. €.±X.:€, D2 AB BO 2E B1 7F F6 1D ES 79 O3 .ö.BcÞ%µéy.¾/C'. G1... ANÓ: ŽIEbfof 47 66 14 4D D3 9E 66 ^È>3...Ž20°6< ∉Û; 88 CB 3E 53 2E .ūf`.O.iā..Ü~€6! u‰a″OÏÌ∙Ç4–u±4È. ζ.μCėĖ́⇒G.;Σp2μ. D5 F8 ÖsK.-S.21 ÁPc..-ý È×(îC«7EcdiII.~Ô Hì(:UÌ.ÄHE.àF... 35 99 5™œéó3É..Ý.U`i3D C9 05 1B DD 11 55 B7 FF ÞÑ≪†nŹù.₩±ŠKz?H/ DE D1 BC B1 8A 09 ZZ .".öp!t%L.'.óìl. gäalë.Ž\$i.Q*~.çè 1C BE 24 69 05 51 B2 94 9F ″∛~x=tä.%¬õ`.õ7> .YB'Ø'VËÙF.Wİ.EK 90 59 Œ€cầv⊣..`Ö,.ixÉÜ 8C 8D 60 D4 BB E5 AC 12 6A 4F CC DE 08 60 25 54 43 D8 D7 BE 73 å¬.jOÍÞ.`%TCØ×%∋ 61;.,-0±00`e″ fa 36 60 ở′ ở{ri?.þ.B ‱\$w Ϋ́αœΟβ⇒Ṻ́ΞΎ*όÆοŽ2< 0.8-₩Tİ^uŸŸE.Ÿ.3 \<: Ċ@..i;t~#ð~Ÿ 5C 3C 90 71 .qQÞ.*E*æÝú.srD.{, l§aÍ?.Ø%±x.|P€5Ö C4 A7 61 CD 37 05 D8 25 81 78 8F 7C 50 ZC E7 ,ç|X%aé187Û.||Ÿ '|.Ŭ%¦..α00.%¦q° b²Ϋ́°.+f3.a9;^ÞWÌ £t0±nduiXsVÁ.f20 0.7.Ś<\È.b^.8U.D **J**9 19 75 OF 1C 81 C3 61 AO 60 CB u....äa4.VéÍ mË)6 34 OF 56 E9 CD 29 36 9E 59 9C FF 31 39 DA 4C 1E CO AE E3 E0 FA 8D 24 _ żYaw19.L. A@aau.S

Drive was 99% erased

- 1% of the drive contained data patterns
- Could have been an encrypted version of the fingerprint
- Went to manufacturer
- Engineers produced a report documenting that the patterns were metadata and firmware


Problems

11


- Don't want to contact the manufacturer every time
- Talking to the manufacturer is expensive and time consuming
 - Manufacturer has to allocate engineers
 - Engineers take time to produce a report
 - Manufacturer might not have designed the controller
 - Somebody has to interpret to manufacturers report
- Easiest to verify a drive that is all 0s

Overview

- Past work in sanitizing disks
- US Coast Guard RMMs
 - Introduction
 - Sanitization & Evaluation
 - Report
- Scramble and Finally Erase (SAFE)




- Traditional Sanitization Process
 - Sanitize and Initialize in a single step
 - Drive is INITIALIZED after a sanitize




- Crypto-Erase "Sanitization" Process
 - Delete keys
 - Drive is INITIALIZED after a sanitize

SAFE: Scramble and Finally Erase




SAFE breaks this up and adds two new states: KEYLESS and VERIFIABLE



Scramble: Drive is actively being encrypted

- On sanitize, delete the keys (KEYLESS)
- This step takes milliseconds



Erase: Perform a block erase after scramble

- We can easily verify the drive (VERIFIABLE)
- This step takes minutes

Conclusion

- Sanitizing storage media is essential for data security
- Need to verify sanitization effectiveness
- Metadata and encryption can make verification difficult
- SAFE is a system that allows us to verify drives with the protection of encryption